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Accordingly, the state court had to confront the issue of whether
discovery of other claims comes within the scope of 3101(f).
Nevertheless, in view of the statute's purpose to promote
realistic negotiations, the Folgate court appears to have reached the
proper decision. Narrowly reading CPLR 3101 (f) to restrict discov-
ery to information on the face of the insurance policy44 would
clearly emasculate the statute in situations where information not
disclosed by the policy itself affects the amount of money actually
available to the plaintiff should he be awarded judgment. On the
other hand, the liberal construction given in Folgate ensures CPLR
3101(f)'s viability as a settlement-inducing statute.4"
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3215(e): Predemand complaint viewed as sufficient to satisfy re-
quirements for entry of default judgment.
Service of a summons alone, unaccompanied by either notice
or a complaint, commences a civil action 46 and necessitates a de-
fendant's appearance4 7 on pain of default. 48 Before a judgment of
default can be entered, however, a plaintiff is required under
CPLR 3215(e) to file proof that either a summons and complaint or
a summons and notice49 have been duly served upon the defen-
dant. Consequently, when failure to appear follows service of a
bare summons, entry of a default judgment is precluded 5 unless
an essential issue in the case, viz insurance coverage. See note 25 supra. What funds are
available under a malpractice insurance policy is obviously irrelevant, however, to the issue
of whether a doctor has committed malpractice.
" The defendant in Folgate argued that since CPLR 3101(f) is in derogation of the
common law, it must be strictly construed. - Misc. 2d at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 385. Justice
Lazer properly ignored this point, however, since CPLR 104 impliedly makes inapplicable
the rule calling for strict construction of statutes changing the common law. See FOURTH REP.
46.
4 Cf. Monell v. International Business Machs. Corp., 85 Misc. 2d 323, 324, 378
N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1976).
46 CPLR 304.
" A defendant who has been served with a summons by personal delivery within the
State must appear within 20 days of such service. Service of the summons by any other
method as well as service without the State require the defendant's appearance within 30
days after service is complete. CPLR 320(a); 1 WK&M $1 320.02.
" A default occurs when a party fails to appear, plead, or timely carry out other
procedural steps in the litigation. CPLR 3215(a); 8 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 63:64, at 717 (1966);
H. WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 321 (4th ed. 1973).
" Before a default judgment can be entered against a party, he must be apprised of the
subject matter of the action and the relief sought. Accordingly, if a plaintiff wishes to
preserve his right to judgment in the event of default, the summons must be accompanied
by a copy of the complaint or a notice stating the object of the action and the monetary
amount for which judgment will be taken in the event of default. See CPLR 305(b), 3215(e).
" Several commentators have expressed the view that the legislature did not intend the
service of a bare summons to preclude entry of a default judgment since such a harsh result
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the plaintiff is permitted to serve the required pleading subsequent
to the default. Absent a defendant's demand for a complaint, such
belated service is not expressly authorized by the CPLR.5' In fact,
pre-CPLR case law regarded service of a complaint prior to de-
mand as a nullity.5 2 - Nevertheless, in Keyes v. McLaughlin,53 the
Appellate Division, Third Department, implicitly recognized pre-
demand service of a complaint as sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments for entry of a default judgment. 54
The plaintiff in Keyes instituted a personal injury action by
service of a bare summons. No further action was taken by either
party until 5 years later when plaintiff prepared to seek a default
judgment by sending a complaint to the defendant's insurance
carrier. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to proceed to enter a default judgment within the 1-year period
prescribed by CPLR 3215(c).5 5 The court granted the motion,
rejecting the plaintiff's contention that "sufficient cause" to justify
the inordinate delay had been shown.5 6 Of greater significance,
is inconsistent with the legislative decision to make service of the complaint or notice with the
summons optional. See, e.g., H. PETERFREUND & J. MCLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACrICE 1301
(3d ed. 1973); 4 WK&M 3215.19; Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional
Motions in New York, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 374, 397 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Homburger &
Laufer]. The history of this problem can be traced to an early committee proposal that all
but matrimonial actions be commenced by simultaneous service of a summons and com-
plaint. FIRST REP. 60. Accordingly, the original draft of CPLR 3215(e) required proof of
service of both summons and complaint prior to entry of default judgment. Simultaneous
service of summons and complaint, however, was made optional under the CPLR. The
legislature then sought to conform the proof requirements of 3215(e) by adding the provi-
sion for notice to be served in place of the complaint. See 4 WK&M 3215.19. Absolute
conformity, however, was never achieved. While it is possible to commence an action by
service of a bare summons, entry of default judgment under CPLR 3215(e) still necessitates
proof of additional service of a complaint or notice.
" See 7B McKINNEY'" CPLR 3012, commentary at 583 (1974). CPLR 3012(b) provides
that "[i]f the complaint is not served with the summons, the defendant may serve a written
demand for the complaint."
52 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text infra.
53 49 App. Div. 2d 974, 373 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
34 Id. at 975, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
5Id. at 974, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 892. CPLR 3215(c) states:
If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year
after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint
as abandoned ... unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be
dismissed.
16 The court held that plaintiff's infancy at the time of the accident and his reliance
upon counsel's promises of diligent prosecution did not constitute "sufficient cause" within
the meaning of CPLR 3215(c). 49 App. Div. 2d at 974, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
The public policy consideration underlying CPLR 3215(c) is "[t]o prevent plaintiffs from
unreasonably delaying the termination of an action." Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v.
Zolfo Merchandising, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 872, 873, 311 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970), citing 13 REP. N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL 216 (1947). In general, the New York
courts appear to have construed the "sufficient cause" language of 3215(c) to require fairly
compelling circumstances. See Bubin v. County of Nassau, 31 App. Div. 2d 763, 297
N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.) (successive misfortunes suffered by attorney not
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however, was the language of the court implying that service of a
complaint within the 1-year limitation period satisfies the require-
ments of CPLR 3215(e) and permits the plaintiff to obtain a default
judgment notwithstanding the defendant's failure to serve a writ-
ten demand. 57
The position of the Keyes court conflicts with that taken by the
First Department in the 1928 case of Gluckselig v. H. Michaelyan,
Inc. 58 The Gluckselig court affirmed the granting of the defendant's
motion to vacate a judgment by default on the ground that service
of a complaint before appearance and demand was invalid.5 9 The
court's holding reflected the fact that pre-CPLR practice rules
required the recipient of a bare summons to demand a copy of the
complaint. 60 Significantly, however, no such requirement is im-
posed by the CPLR.6 ' This omission together with the Gluckselig
sufficient cause); Herzbrun v. Levine, 23 App. Div. 2d 744, 259 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1st Dep't
1965) (mem.) (loss of contact with attorney not sufficient cause); Milligan v. Hycel Realty
Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 527, 245 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1963) (mem.), appeal dismissed mere.,
14 N.Y.2d 581, 198 N.E.2d 256, 248 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (secretarial error not sufficient
cause). In Abrams v. Resort Constr. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 735, 329 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2d
Dep't) (mem.), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. Abrams v. Seaboard Pools, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 674,
282 N.E.2d 890, 332 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1972), however, the court found that sufficient cause
had been established where the plaintiff was an unskilled California laborer who could not
afford trips to New York to prosecute his cause of action. The Abrams court was favorably
impressed by the fact that the defendants were periodically informed of the progress of the
litigation. 38 App. Div. 2d at 736, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37. The requirements for excusable
delay under CPLR 3215(c) have been likened to the conditions that will defeat a motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute under CPLR 3216. See Milligan v. Hycel Realty Corp., 20
App. Div. 2d 527, 245 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1963) (mem.), appeal dismissed mein., 14 N.Y.2d
581, 198 N.E.2d 256, 248 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
5 See 49 App. Div. 2d at 975, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
8 225 App. Div. 666, 231 N.Y.S. 757 (1st Dep't 1928).59 Id., affg mem. 132 Misc. 783, 230 N.Y.S. 593 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1928). The
Gluckselig plaintiff had instituted an action by service of a bare summons. Five days later a
complaint was left at the defendant's place of business; the defendant had neither filed a
notice of appearance nor made a demand for a complaint. On the 20th day after service of
summons, the defendant appeared by attorney and made the appropriate demand. Ten
days later, the defendant attempted to file an answer. This was rejected, however, and a
default judgment was entered. See 132 Misc. at 783-84, 230 N.Y.S. at 593-94. The supreme
court granted the motion to vacate judgment, holding that the complaint served before
appearance and demand was a nullity and thus ineffective to require an answer. Id. at
784-85, 230 N.Y.S. at 595. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed this decision
in a memorandum opinion. Similar reasoning appears to have been employed by the courts
in Crouse v. Reichert, 15 N.Y.S. 369 (Sup. Ct. 4th Dep't 1891), and Everett v. Everett, 150
Misc. 609, 269 N.Y.S. 833 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933).
60 CPA 257 required the defendant to demand a copy of the complaint within 20 days
after service of summons.
11 CPLR 3012(b), quoted in note 51 supra, provides that the defendant may demand a
copy of the complaint. The 20-day time limitation imposed by its counterpart under the
CPA, see note 60 supra, was deleted when the decision was made to allow for optional service
of the complaint at the commencement of an action. 3 WK&M 1 3012.03. The only
explanation for this deletion was that a time limit was "unnecessary [since] time to appear is
covered by . . . [CPLR 320(a), the appearance statute]." FIFrH REP. A-418. This rationale is
confusing, as an appearance and a demand for a complaint are not identical. 3 WK&M
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rule enables the astute defendant who has been served with only a
bare summons to completely frustrate entry of default judgment.
The defendant need only forego his option to demand to preclude
service of the requisite complaint. 62 Upon the expiration of the
statutory 1-year limitation period, the defaulting party can move to
dismiss the complaint as abandoned. 63 Statewide legislative orjudi-
cial adoption of the Keyes rationale would uniformly rectify this
anomalous result.
The Keyes position can also be extended to remedy a similar
problem which may arise when the defendant elects not to default.
For example, a defendant served with a bare summons may appear
in the action by the mere filing of a notice of appearance. If he
takes no further action, i.e. serves no written demand for a com-
plaint, under the Gluckselig rule which invalidates service of a com-
plaint without demand, the plaintiff is effectively barred from
continuing to prosecute his action. The defendant cannot be held
in default, yet he has successfully obstructed the progress of the
litigation. 64 Application of the Keyes principle to this situation
would empower the plaintiff to complete service and continue his
lawsuit.
The import of the Keyes opinion is clear. Should its rationale be
sanctioned by the Court of Appeals or the legislature, a plaintiff
who institutes an action by service of a summons alone will no
longer have to fear the possible loss of his cause of action through
the defendant's failure to demand a complaint. The plaintiff need
only be warned that if the defendant fails to appear in the action,
the period of limitations for entry of default judgment requires
service of the complaint within 1 year of the failure to appear. 65
Until such time as it becomes clear that predemand service will be
uniformly recognized, however, prudent practice will include initial
5 3012.14. The fact that the defendant is required to appear within a specified time does not
create a similar duty to timely serve a demand for a complaint.
62 For a discussion of the anomalous result produced when the Gluckselig rule is applied
to cases governed by the CPLR, see Homburger & Laufer, supra note 50, at 397-99. Prior to
the Keyes decision, Professor David D. Siegel surmised that under the CPLR service of a
complaint without demand might be effective if the complaint is served in the same manner
as the summons. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3215, commentary at 872-73 (1970).63 See note 55 supra.
" Several commentators have expressed the opinion, presumably shared by the Keyes
court, that the Gluckselig case does not represent the law under the CPLR. See, e.g., 3 WK&M
$ 3012.03; Homburger & Laufer, supra note 50, at 398. This position is based on the theory
that Gluclselig should have no bearing on post-CPLR cases since it was based on the CPA
requirement that the defendant demand a copy of the complaint. See notes 60-61 and
accompanying text supra.
'5-See CPLR 3215(c), quoted in note 55 supra.
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service of either a summons and a complaint or a summons with
notice. 66
COURT OF APPEALS RULES- OF PRACTICE
22 NYCRR 500.6(a): Dismissal of appeal for want of prosecution pre-
cludes subsequent appeal in a civil action.
Rule 500.6(a) of the New York Court of Appeals Rules of
Practice requires that an appeal be argued or submitted within 9
months after leave to appeal is granted by the lower court.6 7 Non-
compliance with this provision results in a summary dismissal for
want of prosecution. 68 Recently, in Bray v. Cox, 69 the Court of
Appeals held that such a dismissal in a civil case is an adjudication
on the merits which bars any subsequent appeal of the same is-
sues.
70
The Bray plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by defen-
dant's decedent while the two were returning from a trip to Buf-
falo, New York. The vehicle collided with a utility pole, killing the
driver and injuring the plaintiff. Both parties were residents of
Ontario, Canada, and the car was registered and insured there.
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant's
estate in the Supreme Court, Erie County, to recover for personal
injuries. The court ruled that the Ontario guest statute, which
precluded recovery,7 1 was applicable and dismissed the complaint.
The appellate division reversed, finding error on the conflict of
laws issue. 72 The defendant obtained leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals, but his failure to file and serve the necessary papers for
more than a year resulted in dismissal of the appeal pursuant to
6 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary at 582 (1974).
67 22 NYCRR 500.6(a) provides:
An appeal must be argued or submitted within nine months after the appeal is
taken. If it is not so argued or submitted a summary order of dismissal shall be
entered on the minutes by the clerk without regard to whether or not the record
and briefs have been filed. Notice of entry thereof shall be given by mail to
attorneys of record in the cause.
68 A motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, however, will be denied upon a showing
of an adequate reason for the delay. 10 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 70:260, at 530 (1966);
Peterfreund, Civil Practice, 1959 Survey of New York Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1563, 1581 (1959).
69 38 N.Y.2d 350, 342 N.E.2d 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1976) (per curiam).7 0 Id. at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
71 ONr. REv. STAT. c. 202, § 132(3) (1970) provides:
[T]he owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the
business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle, except
where such loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the gross negligence of
the driver of the motor vehicle.
72 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (4th Dep't 1972).
[Vol. 50:575
